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Solemnisation of Same-sex Marriage
and Religious Freedom
RE X AH D A R 1
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago, New Zealand
Same-sex marriage is legal or likely to be legalised in many Western nations. One important
safeguard invariably incorporated in the legislation providing for same-sex marriage has been
an exemption for religious ministers who object to solemnising such marriages. Another
category of potential objectors consists of marriage registrars, commissioners or celebrants
employed or appointed by the state. By contrast, an accommodation grounded in the right
of religious freedom and conscience for these governmental celebrants has not been granted.
This article examines the introduction of same-sex marriage in three jurisdictions –
England and Wales, New Zealand and Canada. It analyses the precise ambit of the
exemption for religious celebrants, considers the vulnerability of such exemptions to future
legal challenge and questions the validity of denying free exercise accommodation to
state-appointed celebrants.
Keywords: same-sex marriage, conscientious objection, religious freedom
INTRODUCTION
Same-sex marriage (‘SSM’) has recently been legalised in several Western nations
and is likely to become so in others.2 A recurrent issue has been the rights of those
who usually solemnise marriages to refuse to do so in the case of same-sex couples.
Some religious ministers, clergy, marriage celebrants, commissioners and regis-
trars may have a conscientious objection to conducting marriage ceremonies for
people of the same sex. Their objection is usually grounded in sincere religious
beliefs about the propriety of homosexual and lesbian relationships.
This article considers the attempts to craft an exemption for such marriage
celebrants based on solicitude for their religious convictions. My starting
point is that no-one ought to be forced to marry a couple against that person’s
religious beliefs or conscience. Where the celebrant refuses to do so, he or
1 My thanks to Matthew Mortimer for his research assistance. This article is based on a presentation
given at the Third International Consortium of Law and Religion Scholars Conference at the
University of Virginia School of Law on 23 August 2013.
2 Same-sex marriage is legal in The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Spain,
Portugal, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Canada, New Zealand, France, and England and
Wales. See Pew Research Centre, Religion and Public Life Project, ‘Gay marriage around the world’,
16 July 2013, available at ,http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/16/gay-marriage-around-the-world-
2013/., accessed 2 June 2014.
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she should be permitted to do so by the state. Ideally, the law ought to make it
clear that there is no legal obligation on celebrants in such circumstances to
conduct SSMs. Likewise, the relevant anti-discrimination laws that prohibit dis-
crimination on the grounds of sexual orientation ought to explicitly exempt mar-
riage celebrants from performing SSMs.
Yet carving out a suitable exemption has proved rather harder to achieve than
one might expect. This, at least, has been the experience in New Zealand,
Canada, and England and Wales, the three jurisdictions that form the focus of
this article.3 I will not consider the case for exemption for those who have a con-
scientious objection to participating in SSM aside from the actual solemnisation
ceremony itself. Thus, caterers, photographers, musicians, florists, those who
hire out reception halls or rent bridal and honeymoon suites, and so on,
remain a topic for further investigation.4
The article first examines the exemption provided for in New Zealand. The
focus then turns to Canada and a major case analysing the constitutionality of
conscience exemptions for state marriage celebrants. The path towards legalisa-
tion of SSM in England and Wales is then traced and the complex exemption
mechanism is explained. I close with some concluding thoughts.
NEW ZEALAND
New Zealand became the thirteenth nation to legalise SSM when it passed the
Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Act 2013 on 19 April 2013.5 Preserving reli-
gious freedom for those church ministers and other marriage celebrants who
did not wish to conduct SSMs featured prominently in the public debate.6
The Bill’s promoter,7 the Labour Party MP Louisa Wall, gave repeated assurances
that religious liberty would be respected: ‘Because we have freedom of religion
in New Zealand, no religious body is bound to marry a couple if that marriage is
at odds with its religious belief.’8 The exemption in its final form reads:
29. Licence authorises but not obliges marriage celebrant to solemnise
marriage
(1) A marriage licence shall authorise but not oblige any marriage celebrant
to solemnise the marriage to which it relates.
3 See B MacDougall, E Bonthuys, K Norrie and M van den Brink, ‘Conscientious objection to creating
same-sex unions: an international analysis’, (2012) 1 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 127–164.
4 See, eg, I Lupu and R Tuttle, ‘Same-sex family equality and religious freedom’, (2010) 5 Northwestern
Journal of Law and Social Policy 274–306.
5 Public Act 2013, No 20. The Act came into force on 19 August 2013 (s 2). The Bill was passed by 77
votes to 44 by way of a free (conscience) vote.
6 See M Backhouse, ‘Wall: Gay Marriage Bill will allow choice’, New Zealand Herald, 10 March 2013.
7 This was a Private Member’s Bill not a Government Bill.
8 First Reading, 683 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (‘NZPD’) 4914, 29 August 2012.
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(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), no celebrant who is a
minister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in
Schedule 1, and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnise mar-
riages by an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnise a marriage if
solemnising that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of the
religious body or the religious beliefs or philosophical or humanitarian
convictions of the approved organisation.
Despite the Select Committee’s hope that this section would suffice to assuage
those with religious liberty concerns, a flaw still remains: the exemption is
simply not worded widely enough.9
First, marriage celebrants who are ‘independent’ – that is, not members of
any of the listed religious bodies10 or any approved organisation11 – are not pro-
tected. Yet some 45 per cent of marriages are conducted by these independent
celebrants (with 23 per cent by registrars at a state registry office and 32 per
cent by a church or approved organisation marriage celebrant).12 Independent
marriage celebrants are persons who ‘will conscientiously perform the duties
of a marriage celebrant’ and ‘it is in the interests of the public generally, or of
a particular community (whether defined by geography, interest, belief, or
some other factor)’ that they be so appointed.13 Such persons may well have
beliefs that generate a conscientious objection to SSM. It was erroneous, there-
fore, for the Ministry of Justice to recommend that independent celebrants be
excluded from the benefit of the conscientious objection exemption in section
29(2).14 The Ministry’s response was that, in contrast to ministers of religion,
independent celebrants (and registrars) are appointed by the government ‘to
perform a public function, not to promote their own religious or personal
beliefs’.15
Second, and perhaps even more importantly, ministers of religion of desig-
nated religious bodies may not be protected either. Ministers within tightly
knit homogeneous denominations such as the Open Brethren, Seventh-Day
9 See R Ahdar, ‘Gay marriage and preserving religious freedom for celebrants’, Pundit, 14 March 2013,
available at ,http://www.pundit.co.nz/content/gay-marriage-and-preserving-religious-freedom-for-
celebrants., accessed 2 June 2014.
10 The designated religious bodies are listed in Schedule 1 of the Marriage Act 1955.
11 Marriage Act 1955, s 10(4).
12 Ministry of Justice, Departmental Report for the Government Administration Committee, 13 February 2013,
at p 4, available at ,http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/sc/documents/advice/50SCGA_ADV_
00DBHOH_BILL11528_1_A318744/departmental-report-ministry-of-justice., accessed 5 June 2014.
13 Marriage Act 1955, s 11(3)(a)(b).
14 Ministry of Justice, Departmental Report, at para 49. On the erroneous nature of the recommenda-
tion, see Legal Opinion by New Zealand barrister, I Bassett, for Family First NZ, 6 March 2013, at
paras 7 to 14, available at ,http://bobmccoskrie.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Legal-Opinion-
6-March-Marriage-Act-Amendment-Bill.pdf., accessed 2 June 2014.
15 Ministry of Justice, Departmental Report, at para 50.
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Adventists or Elim (Pentecostal) Churches are not vulnerable. Rather, it is a reli-
gious minister whose more heterogeneous denomination is divided on gay mar-
riage who may not be able to point to any authoritative ruling, precept, custom or
teaching that states that only heterosexual marriage is acceptable. The main-
stream Protestant denominations – Presbyterian, Methodist and Anglican –
have struggled to formulate a clear policy on this matter.16
The long-running battle over the ordination of gay clergy in the Presbyterian
Church of Aotearoa New Zealand is a poignant reminder of how contentious
matters of sexual practice and sexual orientation are.17 At their 2012 General
Assembly, Presbyterians passed a resolution affirming that the Church
‘upheld the historic Christian understanding of marriage as the loving, faithful
union of a man and a woman’.18 The Assembly narrowly declined, however, to
adopt a proposal that would have prohibited ministers from administering mar-
riage ceremonies between same-sex couples.
Other denominations have yet to grasp the nettle. The Anglican Church
announced that its ministers may not conduct same-sex weddings pending a
report to its next General Synod in May 2014.19 Meanwhile, a conservative
Anglican minister who declines to marry a gay couple is unable to point to
any ruling of the regional or national diocese that states that marriage is only
for opposite-sex couples. The blessing of the same-sex nuptials might contra-
vene the religious beliefs of his own congregation or the sizeable conservative
sector of New Zealand Anglicanism – but that is not the same thing. One MP
commented that she would personally appear as a witness in support of any
minister embroiled in litigation to state that that minister ‘had the right to
deny a same-sex couple solemnisation of their wedding’.20 But such a well-
intentioned gesture would be largely ineffectual and little solace for any minister
of religion who had to defend his or her position.
Even if the New Zealand Anglican Church should eventually decide that sol-
emnisation of SSM is allowed, particular Anglican clergy who dissent from that
official line ought to be protected. The right of religious freedom protects all who
practise that faith, not just those whose beliefs accord with the official teaching
of that denomination or group.21 Those holding eccentric, idiosyncratic or even
16 I Davison, ‘Church groups at odds over their definitions of marriage’, New Zealand Herald, 15
November 2012.
17 See, eg, R Ahdar, Worlds Colliding: conservative Christians and the law (Aldershot, 2001), ch 9.
18 General Assembly News, 6 October 2012: ‘Church says no to same-sex marriage’, available at
,http://presbyterian.org.nz/sites/default/files/ga12/saturday/Church_says_no_to_same_sex_mar-
riage.pdf., accessed 2 June 2014.
19 S Collins, ‘Gay weddings ban: churches say no’, New Zealand Herald, 23 April 2013, available at ,http://
www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10879183., accessed 16 June 2014.
20 Ruth Dyson (Labour), 688 NZPD 8528, 13 March 2013.
21 See, eg, Thomas v Review Board, 450 US 707 at 715–16 (1981); R (on the application of Williamson) v
Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2002] EWCA Civ 1820 at para 233. See further R
Ahdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (second edition, Oxford, 2013), pp 175, 195.
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heretical religious beliefs – beliefs at odds with the majority of those of that
faith, that are inconsistent with received church doctrine or contrary to the
views of the church hierarchy (if any such hierarchy exists) – ought to be pro-
tected too. Religious freedom is not just for the ‘orthodox’ or for those who
happen to abide by the views of the majority of co-religionists or the pronounce-
ments of the ecclesiastical or ruling elite. Appellate courts have acknowledged
this. The Supreme Court of Canada stated that: ‘An “expert” or an authority
on religious law is not a surrogate for an individual’s affirmation of what his
or her religious beliefs are.’22 The House of Lords observed:
The court is concerned to ensure an assertion of religious belief is made in
good faith: ‘neither fictitious, nor capricious, and that it is not an artifice’
. . . But, emphatically, it is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the
asserted belief and judge its ‘validity’ by some objective standard such as
the source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or the ortho-
dox teaching of the religion in question or the extent to which the clai-
mant’s belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing
the same religion. Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of
an individual. . . . [R]eligious belief is intensely personal and can easily
vary from one individual to another. Each individual is at liberty to hold
his own religious beliefs, however irrational or inconsistent they may
seem to some, however surprising.23
In the light of this I proposed an amendment to section 29(2):
Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), no celebrant who is a min-
ister of religion recognised by a religious body enumerated in Schedule 1,
and no celebrant who is a person nominated to solemnize marriages by
an approved organisation, is obliged to solemnize a marriage if solemnizing
that marriage would contravene the religious beliefs of that celebrant.
But this change was not adopted. So, for now, the position of conservative church
ministers within the mainstream Protestant denominations remains precarious.
CANADA
In 2004 the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to hear a reference on the
Federal Government’s proposed legislation to extend marriage to same-sex
22 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at para 54 per Iaccobucci J (for the majority).
23 R (on the application of Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment [2005] UKHL 15
at para 22 per Lord Nicholls.
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couples. One of the four questions in Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage was ‘if the
Proposed Act were adopted, religious officials could be required to perform
same-sex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs’.24 The Court was in no
doubt:
If a promulgated statute were to enact compulsion, we conclude that such
compulsion would almost certainly run afoul of the Charter guarantee of
freedom of religion, given the expansive protection afforded to religion
by s. 2(a) of the Charter . . . The performance of religious rites is a funda-
mental aspect of religious practice. It therefore seems clear that state com-
pulsion on religious officials to perform same-sex marriages contrary to
their religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of religion
under s. 2(a) of the Charter. It also seems apparent that, absent exceptional
circumstances which we cannot at present foresee, such a violation could
not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.25
The Court also determined that the legalisation of SSM was consistent with the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982.26
The bill to legalise SSM, Bill C-38, was introduced to the House of Commons
on 1 February 2005 and was passed by that House on 28 June 2005, by 158 to 133
votes, with 32 MPs abstaining.27 The Senate passed the Bill by 47 to 21 votes on
19 July 2005, and it received the Royal Assent on 20 July 2005. The Civil
Marriage Act 200528 defines civil marriage as ‘the lawful union of two
persons to the exclusion of all others’.29 An attempt by the incoming
Conservative Government to restore the traditional opposite-sex definition of
marriage in December 2006 was defeated in the House of Commons.30
Religious freedom for religious ministers featured prominently in the parlia-
mentary debates on Bill C-38. The Prime Minister and Liberal Party leader, Paul
Martin, addressed this concern in his second reading speech: ‘the government’s
legislation affirms the charter guarantee: that religious officials are free to
perform such ceremonies in accordance with the beliefs of their faith’.31 The
Leader of the Opposition and Conservative party leader, Stephen Harper, was
not convinced: ‘The so-called protection that the government has offered for
24 2004 SCC 79.
25 Ibid, at paras 56–58.
26 Ibid, at paras 5 and 43.
27 See commentary by M Hurley, ‘Bill C-38: the Civil Marriage Act’, Parliament of Canada, available at
,http://www.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c38&Parl=38&
Ses=1., accessed 2 June 2014.
28 SC 2005, c 33.
29 Civil Marriage Act 2005, s 2.
30 By 175 to 123 votes, 7 December 2006. The vote was a free vote.
31 38th Parliament, 1st Session, HC Deb, 1525, 16 February 2005.
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even basic religious freedom is, frankly, laughably inadequate.’ The Bill provided
‘one meagre clause to protect religious freedom, a clause which states that reli-
gious officials will not be forced to solemnize marriages’.32 Yet, he continued,
‘the Supreme Court of Canada has already ruled that this clause is ultra vires.
It falls within the provincial responsibility for the solemnization of marriage.’33
The Government’s proposal, in his view, fell well short of comprehensive protec-
tion. Harper proffered the following further protections to anticipate future
challenges:
Parliament can ensure that no religious body will have its charitable status
challenged because of its beliefs or practices regarding them. Parliament
could ensure that beliefs and practices regarding marriage will not affect
the eligibility of a church, synagogue, temple or religious organization to
receive federal funds, for example, federal funds for seniors’ housing or
for immigration projects run by a church. Parliament could ensure that
the Canadian Human Rights Act or the Broadcasting Act are not inter-
preted in a way that would prevent the expression of religious beliefs
regarding marriage.34
In the end, none of these additional protections floated by the Opposition were
taken up – bar one. The one concession was a new clause in the Preamble (when
the Bill returned from the Legislative Committee) to assuage concerns about
freedom of expression: ‘Whereas it is not against the public interest to hold
and publicly express diverse views on marriage.’ Even here, the wording is
somewhat coy, preferring the term ‘diverse’ to ‘traditional’, ‘conservative’ or
some other epithet indicating positive endorsement of heterosexual-only
marriage.
The Civil Marriage Act, in its final form, states:
Preamble
WHEREAS nothing in this Act affects the guarantee of freedom of con-
science and religion and, in particular, the freedom of members of reli-
gious groups to hold and declare their religious beliefs and the freedom
of officials of religious groups to refuse to perform marriages that are
not in accordance with their religious beliefs; . . .
32 38th Parliament, 1st Session, HC Deb, 1605, 15 February 2005. The Supreme Court in Reference re
Same-sex Marriage 2004 SCC 79 at para 39 held that, pursuant to s 92(12) of the Constitution Act
1867, only the Provincial legislatures, not the Federal Parliament, may legislate exemptions to solem-
nisation of marriage requirements.
33 38th Parliament, 1st Session, HC Deb, 1605, 15 February 2005.
34 Ibid.
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3. It is recognized that officials of religious groups are free to refuse to
perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs.
3.1 For greater certainty, no person or organization shall be deprived of any
benefit, or be subject to any obligation or sanction, under any law of the
Parliament of Canada solely by reason of their exercise, in respect of mar-
riage between persons of the same sex, of the freedom of conscience and
religion guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
respect of marriage as the union of a man and woman to the exclusion of
all others based on that guaranteed freedom.
Originally, the Bill just contained section 3, the ‘one meagre clause’ that Harper
alluded to above. Section 3.1 was added after the Bill came back from the
Legislative Committee.35
Clearly, officials of religious bodies are protected. Are registrars (or, as they
are called in Canada, marriage commissioners) also protected? This question
was explored by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Re Marriage
Commissioners appointed under the Marriage Act 1955.36 The Saskatchewan
Marriage Act provides that various listed religious clergy may solemnise mar-
riages, as well as marriage commissioners appointed by the Minister.
Following the legalisation of SSM, some marriage commissioners refused to sol-
emnise SSM on the basis that they could not do so without violating their reli-
gious beliefs.37 Mr Orville Nichols was one.38 He lodged a human rights
complaint against the Saskatchewan Government alleging religious discrimin-
ation under the province’s human rights law. In turn, a human rights complaint
was filed against him, alleging that he had acted in a discriminatory manner by
refusing to perform an SSM ceremony. The Human Rights Tribunal upheld the
latter complaint and Nichols lost his appeal in the Court of Queen’s Bench.39
Given this litigation, the Province submitted two questions to the Court of
Appeal. The first concerned a proposed statutory exemption for commissioners
appointed before the change in the law occurred, the so-called ‘Grandfathering
Option’. The second question concerned an exemption for all commissioners
regardless of when they were appointed, the ‘Comprehensive Option’.40 The
Grandfathering Option is below, while the Comprehensive Option is the provi-
sion below minus the words in bold:
35 As reported to the House of Commons on 16 June 2005.
36 2011 SKCA 3; (2011) 327 DLR (4th) 669.
37 Following SSM legalisation, eight commissioners resigned and three lodged human rights com-
plaints against the Saskatchewan Government: 2011 SKCA 3 at paras 11 and 13.
38 Ibid, at para 13.
39 Nichols v Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) 2009 SKQB 299.
40 Marriage Commissioners 2011 SKCA 3 at para 18. The options are in the form of proposed amend-
ments to the Marriage Act 1995, SS 1995, c M-4.1.
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28.1 (1) Notwithstanding The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, a marriage
commissioner who was appointed on or before November 5, 2004 is not
required to solemnize a marriage if to do so would be contrary to the mar-
riage commissioner’s religious beliefs.41
‘November 5, 2004’ is the date on which the Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench
struck down the ban upon SSM in Saskatchewan.42 That court held that a
denial of a marriage licence to a same-sex couple would violate their equality
rights provided in section 15(1) of the Charter. Henceforth, marriage commis-
sioners were instructed that they must perform SSM ceremonies. The
Grandfathering Option is clearly a more narrowly tailored exemption designed
to exempt those commissioners appointed before the date of the legalisation of
SSM. But Nichols’ hopes were to be dashed when the court observed:
‘Commissioners who were appointed before the Queen’s Bench decision recog-
nizing the legality of same-sex marriage in this jurisdiction are in no meaning-
fully different position than those appointed after the decision was rendered.’43
The court first had to decide whether the exemptions infringed the Charter
guarantee of equality. The purpose of the two options was to accommodate
the religious beliefs of certain marriage commissioners and not to deny
same-sex couples the right to marry. 44 Next, although neutral on the surface,
did the options have the effect of denying same-sex couples equal protection or
the benefit of the new law? They did. Gay and lesbian individuals would be
treated differently from other people and this negative differential treatment
was due to their sexual orientation.45 Sexual orientation is not a ground men-
tioned in section 15 but has been recognised as a protected ground analogous
to those enumerated in the section.46 It was argued that the infringement
would be minimal as a same-sex couple turned away by a commissioner
could easily find another one prepared to officiate.47 However, the court was
not persuaded. This argument downplayed the serious offence that such a
refusal might have upon a gay or lesbian person seeking to be wed. Further, it
was possible that the pool of non-objecting commissioners might not be large
enough to ensure same-sex couples’ demands could be met, and this potential
dearth of eligible commissioners would be exacerbated in remote rural
41 The Grandfathering Option also required that Commissioners who sought the benefit of the exemp-
tion had to file a written notice with the Director of the Marriage Unit within three months of the
section coming into force: s 28.1(2)(3).
42 NW v Canada (Attorney General) 2004 SKQB 434.
43 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3 at para 23.
44 Ibid, at para 36.
45 Ibid, at paras 39 and 44.
46 Ibid, at para 39. The Supreme Court recognised sexual orientation as a qualifying analogous ground
under s 15 in Egan v Canada [1985] 2 SCR 513 at 528 and Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 SCR 493 at para 13.
47 Marriage Commissioners at para 40.
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areas.48 The different treatment would also create a disadvantage by perpetuat-
ing prejudice about the worthiness of same-sex unions and this ‘would clearly be
a retrograde step’.49
Rather optimistically it was contended that the Supreme Court in Reference re
Same-Sex Marriage had already determined that legislative initiatives of the sort
at issue here passed constitutional muster. Did not the court say that the state
could not oblige officials of any sort to solemnise same-sex marriages contrary
to their personal religious beliefs?50 This was, replied the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal, a misreading of the decision, for it was plain that the Supreme
Court’s approval of exemptions for ‘religious officials’ was referring only to min-
isters of religion holding formal positions in religious communities, and not to
marriage commissioners.51
Turning to the second stage of the Charter analysis: was the curtailment of the
equality rights of same-sex couples justifiable in terms of section 1? The first
requirement is that the objective of the impugned law must be of sufficient
importance to warrant limiting a Charter right. The broad and important goal
of both options was the accommodation of the religious beliefs of the marriage
commissioners. One could characterise the goal of the options as the denial of
the rights of same-sex couples, but that way of stating the objective was
unhelpful.52
The second requirement is the proportionality analysis. This subdivides into
three matters. First, was there a rational connection between the impugned law
and its objective? Exempting commissioners was clearly rationally connected to
the goal of accommodating such commissioners’ religious beliefs.53 Second, did
the law impair rights and freedoms as little as possible in order to meet its goal?
Here the exemptions foundered. The court raised the possibility of a ‘single
entry point’ system.54 This corrals would-be married couples towards a bureau-
cratic official or some central office, rather than permitting them to contact a
marriage commissioner directly:
What if the request for the services of a marriage commissioner involved
completion of a form indicating, not just the time and place of the pro-
posed ceremony, but also the genders of the two people planning to
marry? . . . Assume too that the Director operated a simple internal system
whereby a commissioner who did not want to perform same-sex marriage
48 Ibid, at paras 42–43.
49 Ibid, at para 45.
50 Ibid, at para 48.
51 Ibid, at para 49.
52 Ibid, at para 77.
53 Ibid, at para 82.
54 Ibid, at para 85.
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ceremonies because of his or her religious beliefs could make that fact
known to the Director. In this sort of arrangement, the Director’s office
could reply to a request for marriage services by privately taking into
account the religious beliefs of commissioners and then providing, to
the couple planning to marry, a list of commissioners in the relevant geo-
graphical area who would be available on the planned date of the wedding
and who would be prepared to officiate.55
Counsel for the marriage commissioners conceded that this kind of procedure
did represent a less restrictive means of attaining the objectives that the commis-
sioners sought. It fell ‘within the range of reasonable alternatives’56 and, in the
court’s view, did not appear to be ‘impractical, overly costly or administratively
unworkable’.57 The court cautioned that its endorsement of a single entry
point system was ‘not necessarily a determination that any such system would
ultimately pass full constitutional muster’.58 Rather, the concrete features of
any particular system would still need to be evaluated to see if it met the
Charter standard.
The third inquiry seeks to determine whether the benefits of the impugned
law are proportionate to the negative effects of it upon citizens’ guaranteed
rights. The salutary effect of the exemptions is that they permit marriage com-
missioners to avoid a violation of their consciences. But this was given modest
weight, for reasons I will return to shortly. The deleterious effects upon same-sex
couples, by contrast, loomed much larger. There was, again, the ‘perpetuat[ion
of ] a brand of discrimination which our national community has only recently
begun to successfully overcome’.59 Second, the denial of marriage by certain
commissioners was ‘devastating’ to the individuals concerned and had a more
generalised ‘ripple’ effect upon the gay community as a whole.60 Third, the
exemptions would ‘undercut the basic principle that governmental services
must be provided on an impartial and non-discriminatory basis’.61 Persons
who ‘voluntarily chose to assume’ a public office, becoming part of ‘the appar-
atus of the state’,62 could not expect to shape that office to conform to their per-
sonal scruples. Rather, the situation was the other way around: ‘Marriage
commissioners do not act as private citizens when they discharge their official
duties. Rather, they serve as agents of the Province and act on its behalf and
55 Ibid, at para 86 (emphasis added).
56 Ibid, at para 84.
57 Ibid, at para 87.
58 Ibid, at para 89 (emphasis added).
59 Ibid, at para 94.
60 Ibid, at paras 95–96.
61 Ibid, at para 98.
62 Ibid.
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its behalf only.’63 It was then ‘readily apparent’64 that the positive effects of the
exemptions did not outweigh their negative effects and thus, the third aspect
(like the second) of the proportionality analysis had not been satisfied.
In the balancing exercise the court gave rather short shrift to the benefits of
respecting the commissioners’ religious liberty. The following paragraph is
telling:
in considering the benefits of the Options, it is also important to note that
the freedom of religion interests they accommodate do not lie at the heart of
s. 2(a) of the Charter. In other words, the Options are concerned only with
the ability of marriage commissioners to act on their beliefs in the world at
large. They do not in any way concern the freedom of commissioners to
hold the religious beliefs they choose or to worship as they wish. This
reality means the benefits flowing from the Options are less significant
than they might appear on the surface.65
For the court, the commissioners’ interests ‘do not lie at the heart’ of this right.
They are still entirely free ‘to worship as they wish’. This stance resonates with
the tenuous distinction between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ religious beliefs and
practices.66 According to this view, declining to do one’s everyday job because
it offends one’s religious scruples is regrettable but fairly ‘small beer’, because
the commissioners can still attend their church, pray, read their bible and go
about their usual avowedly religious rituals. Restricting an aspect of one’s
secular labour is insignificant compared with the circumscribing of the funda-
mental and patently ‘religious’ duties of one’s faith. According to this blinkered
conception of religious free exercise, the former is a mere indirect curtailment
of a secondary or peripheral religious matter whereas the latter represents a
direct incursion upon a primary or central religious activity.
In the court’s understanding, the right to hold religious beliefs is acknowl-
edged and, indeed, inviolable, but acting upon them is another matter. Here
the perennial ‘belief/action’ distinction rears its unsightly head once more.67
Acting upon one’s beliefs must be circumscribed in the interests of society
and to protect the rights of others. But do not be alarmed, for one still can
hold to that belief. This mind-set, with its attenuated conception of religious
exercise (protecting core but not peripheral religious matters, beliefs but not
necessarily actions that manifest such beliefs), is made explicit in the concurring
opinion of Smith JA:
63 Ibid, at para 98.
64 Ibid, at para 99.
65 Ibid, at para 93 (emphasis added).
66 See Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, pp 173–175, for criticism of this dichotomy.
67 See Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, pp 163–165.
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Canadian constitutional jurisprudence has consistently distinguished
between the right to hold certain beliefs and the right to act on those
beliefs, particularly as one moves out of the fundamental area of religious
rites and practices and when acting on a religious belief harms or infringes
the rights of others.68
From this narrow perspective, secular labour by a state-employed official is very
far removed from rituals or liturgical conduct undertaken by a religious official.
Smith JA emphasised that marriage commissioners were carefully devised by
the legislature to be ‘non-religious, civil, as opposed to religious’ celebrants.69
The legislation provided for a long list of religious celebrants, whereas marriage
commissioners conducting a civil, non-religious ceremony were there as a dis-
tinctly secular alternative to cater for those who did not wish to have their mar-
riage conducted in a religious setting or with any religious connotations.70
The notion that marriage commissioners are state employees and therefore
must conform to the state’s juridical norms does not take the argument very
far because another norm, alongside state impartiality in the provision of
public services, is government accommodation of its civil servants’ consciences.
As Geoffrey Trotter puts it: ‘Rights-bearing citizens do not lose their human
rights when they enter public employment.’71 To focus exclusively on the
state’s obligation to same-sex couples is to neglect the position of the
flesh-and-blood providers of the marriage services. Officiating is not (yet)
done by ‘robots and computers’, and as long as the state acts through its citizens
their rights must also be taken into consideration.72 As a good employer, the
state must attempt to make reasonable accommodation for the sincere religious
convictions of its employees. To ignore the duty of reasonable accommodation is
to adopt a stark, take-it-or-leave-it stance: religious commissioners must refash-
ion their beliefs to agree with the state, or take their beliefs with them and leave
government employment.73 Rigid denial of an exemption for devout marriage
commissioners would simply lead to the exclusion of religious persons from
this branch of the public service, an outcome that seems at odds with the
espoused political aim of tolerance and inclusion of all citizens.74
The court believed that exemptions for marriage commissioners would be ‘a
step that would perpetuate disadvantage and involve stereotypes about the
68 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3 at para 146 (Vancise JA concurring) (emphasis added).
69 Ibid, at para 123.
70 Ibid, at paras 123–124.
71 G Trotter, ‘The right to decline performance of same-sex civil marriages: the duty to accommodate
public servants – a response to Professor Bruce MacDougall’, (2007) 70 Saskatchewan Law Review
365–392 at 385.
72 Ibid, p 385.
73 Ibid, pp 366–367, 392.
74 Ibid.
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worthiness of same-sex unions’.75 Bruce MacDougall charged that to only allow
refusals to conduct SSM (and not refusals to marry, say, opposite-race or
divorced couples) demonstrates that the state is not trying to accommodate reli-
gious consciences in general but rather it is ‘simply supportive of religious hos-
tility to homosexuals, ie, homophobia’.76 But this criticism is misplaced, for it
conflates the state with its myriad employees.77 The granting of an exemption
for devout commissioners does not demonstrate that the state necessarily
accepts the views of those commissioners. When the state allows doctors and
nurses the right of conscientious objection from participation in abortion proce-
dures, the state is not accepting or endorsing the stance of those objectors on the
merits of abortion.78 By permitting religious civil servants to opt out of conduct-
ing SSMs, the state does not, as MacDougall argued, in effect, accept the reli-
gious ‘version’ of the issue.79 Rather, an accommodation transmits the
message that the state has solicitude for the consciences of its employees. If any-
thing, the legislature has already decisively rejected the religious stance on the
issue by legalising SSM. An exemption is a departure from the official
‘version’ that SSM is now accepted. As for the accusation of homophobia, a phys-
ician who withdraws from abortion is not (one would hope) motivated by animus
against the woman seeking the procedure, but is simply unable in good con-
science to provide the service herself or himself.80
Smith JA was puzzled as to how conducting a marriage for a same-sex couple
infringed a devout marriage commissioner’s religious freedom at all. He was
unable to see how officiating at a civil ceremony carried any implication or con-
notation at all that the marriage commissioner who officiates necessarily
approved of these types of union.81 By stark contrast, refusing to perform an
SSM ‘without doubt expresses condemnation of same sex unions and practices
as socially harmful and perverse’.82 Performing the ceremony when asked
‘might well be neutral [whereas] refusing to do so is an overtly discriminatory
act’ that engenders psychological anguish and reinforces age-old prejudice.83
As a matter of logic it is difficult to see how performing x is neutral while
refusing to perform x is discriminatory and expresses condemnation of those
seeking x. Furthermore, this approach overemphasises the external appearance
of conduct at the expense of the internal attitude of the moral agent. For
75 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3 at para 45.
76 B MacDougall, ‘Refusing to officiate at same-sex civil marriages’, (2006) 69 Saskatchewan Law
Review 351–374 at 358.
77 Trotter, ‘Right to decline’, p 374.
78 Ibid.
79 MacDougall, ‘Refusing to officiate’, p 365.
80 Trotter, ‘Right to decline’, p 371.
81 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3 at para 142.
82 Ibid (emphasis in original).
83 Ibid.
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example, eating pork may well be a neutral act for most citizens but for certain
people it violates deeply held religious beliefs. A central thrust of freedom of reli-
gion is protection of the individual’s conscience and (subjective) religious sens-
ibilities. It may be hard to comprehend how undertaking a secular task can be
freighted with religious meaning but much mundane activity is religiously sig-
nificant for many religionists.84 So, to say that ‘The performance of a civil mar-
riage by a marriage commissioner . . . is not a religious rite or practice’ and that
‘Nor does the requirement to do so limit or restrict religious belief’ is to miss the
point.85
Even if, continued Smith JA, the performance of SSMs by devout marriage
commissioners did restrict their religious freedom, it would do so ‘only in a sec-
ondary way’ and the curtailment would arguably be ‘trivial or insubstantial, in
that it is interference that does not threaten actual religious beliefs or
conduct’.86 And thus ‘to the extent that this is so, it does not even fall within
the protection of s. 2(a) of the Charter’.87 This simply demonstrates that the
judge has an attenuated understanding of just what constitutes the manifest-
ation of one’s religion.
Although Saskatchewan rejected a statutory exemption for marriage commis-
sioners, Prince Edward Island passed an exemption in 2005 permitting com-
missioners to refuse to solemnise SSMs.88
UNITED KINGDOM
Following a public consultation on SSM which began in March 2012 – and
which elicited 228,000 responses and 19 petitions, the largest response ever
received to a Government consultation89 – the Minister for Women and
Equalities, Maria Miller, introduced the bill to legalise SSM in England and
Wales on 24 January 2013. The Bill was given the Royal Assent on 17 July
2013. The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 states with stark simplicity
that ‘marriage of same sex couples is lawful’.90
Simplicity, however, is not a feature of the statutory provisions for clergy and
other marriage celebrants who seek an exemption from conducting SSM on
grounds of conscience. Churches expressed serious concerns at their right to
84 See Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, ch 10.
85 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3 at para 147.
86 Ibid at para 148.
87 Ibid.
88 Marriage Act (Prince Edward Island), RSPEI 1988, c M-3, s 11.1 (added by An Act to Amend the
Marriage Act, SPEI 2005, c 12, s 7. The section reads: ‘11.1 For greater certainty, a person who is
authorized to solemnize marriage under this Act may refuse to solemnize a marriage that is not
in accordance with that person’s religious beliefs.’
89 Equal Marriage: the Government’s response (London, 2012) at para 1.1.
90 Section 1.
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refuse to marry same-sex couples. The Government’s response was the so-called
‘quadruple lock’, a fourfold bundle of provisions designed to make it clear that
clergy and other religious officials would not be compelled to conduct SSMs.91
Part of the complexity is due to the special position of the Church of England as
the established church.92 This status means that its canons form part of the law
of the land. The Church can amend or repeal primary legislation through a
Measure passed by its Synod, provided that the Measure is later approved by
Parliament and receives the Royal Assent. Most pertinently, its clergy are
under a common-law duty to marry a parishioner in his or her parish church.
The Church in Wales is still under a similar duty by virtue of its previously
being established (it was disestablished in 1920).
The Government’s report on the public consultation recommended that no
religious organisation or its ministers be forced to conduct SSM ceremonies.93
This assurance was consistently reiterated throughout the entire parliamentary
passage of the Bill. The sponsoring Minister stated:
All religious organisations – whether they be Jewish, Muslim, Christian or
any other – will be able to decide for themselves if they want to conduct
same-sex marriages. The Bill provides for and promotes religious
freedom through the Government’s quadruple lock. These protections
are absolutely carved on the face of the Bill and are the foundation on
which the legislation is built.94
The quadruple lock
The first of the four provisions to protect the religious freedom of marriage cele-
brants is an express non-compulsion provision. Part 2 of the Act, headed
‘Religious protection’, opens with section 2:
2. Marriage according to religious rites: no compulsion to solemnize etc
(1) A person may not be compelled by any means (including by the enforce-
ment of a contract or a statutory or other legal requirement) to –
(a) undertake an opt-in activity, or
(b) refrain from undertaking an opt-out activity.
(2) A person may not be compelled by any means (including by the
enforcement of a contract or a statutory or other legal requirement) –
(a) to conduct a relevant marriage,
91 Equal Marriage, at paras 4.19–4.20.
92 See ibid at paras 1.4 and 4.21–4.23.
93 Ibid at paras 1.3 and 4.18–4.27.
94 Maria Miller, HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 129.
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(b) to be present at, carry out, or otherwise participate in, a relevant
marriage,or
(c) to consent to a relevant marriage being conducted,
where the reason for the person not doing that thing is that the relevant mar-
riage concerns a same sex couple.
The right to decline to conduct a ‘relevant marriage’ in section 2(2) refers to ‘a
marriage between same sex couples’.95
Second, the statute sets out an opt-in system so that religious organisations or
individual ministers who wish to conduct marriages for same-sex couples will
need to take positive steps before they can do so. It is unlawful for religious
bodies or their ministers to marry same-sex couples unless the requisite
opt-in requirements have been complied with. An ‘opt-in’ activity is further
defined in a detailed table in section 2(3). If a religious organisation has
decided not to opt in, then none of its ministers will be able to conduct an
SSM.96 If such an organisation has chosen to conduct SSM, its individual min-
isters are still under no compulsion to conduct one unless they decide to do so.97
Third, there are two special provisions to safeguard the position of the estab-
lished church. First, the Church of England’s current stance on SSM (opposing
it) might fall foul of centuries-old legislation, the Clergy Act 1533, which requires
that church law be consistent with the law of the land. So when SSM was lega-
lised the Church’s position might have violated ordinary secular law and been
subject to nullification on that basis. A special provision, however, would avert
this clash and allow the inconsistency between the Church’s no-SSM stance
and the law’s affirmative policy in favour of SSM to continue. Thus, we have
section 1(3):
1(3) No Canon of the Church of England is contrary to section 3 of the
Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (which provides that no Canons shall
be contrary to the Royal Prerogative or the customs, laws or statutes of
this realm) by virtue of its making provision about marriage being the
union of one man with one woman.
Then, there is explicit recognition that it is illegal for the established church to
marry same-sex couples:
1(4) Any duty of a member of the clergy to solemnize marriages (and any
corresponding right of persons to have their marriages solemnized by
95 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, s 2(4).
96 Maria Miller, HC Deb 11 December 2012, vol 555, col 156.
97 Ibid.
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members of the clergy) is not extended by this Act to marriages of same sex
couples.
The term ‘a member of the clergy’ is a clerk in holy orders of the Church of
England or the Church in Wales.98
Finally, the Equality Act 2010 was amended to state explicitly that it is not
unlawful discrimination for a person to refuse to conduct an SSM.99
The Unpicking of the Locks?
Many MPs foresaw the potential for a disappointed same-sex couple to take a
successful claim to the European Court of Human Rights.100 For instance, Sir
Tony Baldry cautioned:
there is an inevitable degree of risk in all this, given that it would ultimately be
for the courts, and in particular the Strasbourg court, to decide whether
provisions in the legislation are compatible with the European convention
on human rights. There is absolutely no doubt that once marriage is rede-
fined in this very fundamental way, a number of new legal questions will
arise and no one can be sure what the eventual outcome will be. The
Government believe that this is a risk worth taking. The Church of
England does not.101
‘It is abundantly plain to most Conservative Members’, charged Sir Roger Gale
in blunter fashion, ‘that the product of the Bill will end up before the European
Court of Human Rights and that people of faith will find that faith trampled
upon.’102 The Bill was a veritable ‘Pandora’s box of endless litigation’, warned
another.103 The Labour MP Michael McCann, blasted:
I am damn sure – as sure as the sun rises in the morning – that a
same-sex couple will go to a church or synagogue and demand to be
married, their demand will be refused and they will go to court; and we
in turn will have to wait to see what new case law is created. By that
time, it is possible that none of us will be serving in the House – we
98 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, s 1(5).
99 Ibid, s 2(5)(6). Section 110 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that a person does not contravenes 110 if
that person does not conduct an SSM. Schedule 3 to the Equality Act (services and public functions)
now has a new Part 6A that contains the exemption for SSM, viz: ‘25A(1). A person does not contra-
vene section 29 only because the person – (a) does not conduct a relevant marriage’.
100 See eg Robert Flello (Lab), HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 146; Jim Shannon (Democratic
Unionist), HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, cols 166–167.
101 HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, cols 144–145 (emphasis added).
102 Ibid, col 152.
103 Stewart Jackson (Con), HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 201.
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may have left politics altogether or indeed left this mortal coil – but in that
set of circumstances people will look back and ask, ‘How did we get into
this mess?’ They will look back in Hansard and say, ‘It’s because we
made a bad law in 2013, and some politician said at the time that there
was a quadruple lock, underpinned by case law.’104
The Bill’s supporters conceded that no-one could totally rule out future litiga-
tion.105 Those who sought ‘a cast iron guarantee’106 were seeking the impos-
sible.107 Yet, it was the Minister herself who had fuelled such an expectation
when she confidently assured the House that ‘the system of locks will iron-clad
the protection’ of religious bodies.108 Others were only a little less categorical
and relied upon the advice of the Attorney-General to the effect that ‘case law
in the European Court of Human Rights makes it infinitesimally unlikely that
any such challenge would succeed’.109 Lord Pannick assured the Public Bill
Committee by written memorandum that: ‘For the European Court of Human
Rights to compel a religious body or its adherents to conduct a religious mar-
riage of a same sex couple would require a legal miracle much greater than
the parting of the Red Sea.’110 As the Minister explained, ‘the Government’s
legal position has confirmed that, with appropriate legislative drafting, the
chance of a successful legal challenge through domestic or European courts is
negligible’.111 And again, ‘It is simply inconceivable that the Court would
require a faith group to conduct same-sex marriages in breach of its own doc-
trines.’112 Lord Faulks did ‘not share the enthusiasm of some noble Lords for
the Strasbourg jurisprudence’ and, while some of his colleagues predicted
that it was ‘inconceivable’ that there would be a challenge, he was ‘not as confi-
dent as they are – few lawyers are’.113 Lord Brennan agreed: ‘it would be näve to
assume that the problems that have been raised by other barristers will not
encounter serious disputation in our courts and in Strasbourg’.114
Lords Faulks and Brennan were to be vindicated with alacrity. Within just one
month of the Act’s passing, the homosexual couple chosen by the Government
to promote the SSM legislation announced that they were taking a case to
Strasbourg to force the Church of England (to which they belonged) to marry
104 HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 180.
105 Hugh Robertson (Con), HC Deb 28 February 2013, vol 558, col 280.
106 Such as Sir Gerald Kaufman (Lab), HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 125.
107 As noted, eg, by Lord Alli, HL Deb 19 June 2013, col 274.
108 Maria Miller, HC Deb 11 December 2012, vol 555, col 156.
109 Margot James (Lab), HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 163.
110 Quoted in the speech by Hugh Robertson (Con), HC Deb 28 February 2013, vol 558, col 280.
111 Maria Miller, HC Deb 11 December 2012, vol 555, col 156.
112 Maria Miller, HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 131 (quoting ‘the eminent QCs Lord Pannick,
Baroness Kennedy and Lord Lester’).
113 HL Deb 4 June 2013, col 1067.
114 Ibid, col 1070.
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them in their local parish of Danbury, Essex.115 It is difficult to forecast how the
European Court of Human Rights would rule to such UK applicants. Some
members were never persuaded that the quadruple locks (‘Fort Knox locks’, as
one member mocked116) would not be ‘picked’ by the Strasbourg court.117
In Schalk and Kapf v Austria, the European Court of Human Rights held that
SSM legalisation was a matter for each state.118 It also noted the sociological fact
that ‘a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same sex couples had taken
place in many member states’ over the last decade.119 This might suggest a readi-
ness to recognise a right for same-sex couples to be married by religious as well as
civil bodies. But the right of religious group autonomy under Article 9 has also
been consistently and forcefully affirmed.120 In the recent Good Shepherd case,
the Grand Chamber reaffirmed the right of a religious community to determine
matters of internal governance,121 including the duties of members of its clergy.122
For now at least, the locks do appear to be reasonably secure from Strasbourg
attack. Unpicking by future UK parliaments is a different matter. As Lord
Naseby reminded: ‘Safeguards are not met by quadruple locks. Locks can be
undone by any fiendishly good legislator anywhere in the world.’123 Including,
one might gratuitously add, those who inhabit Westminster.
Exemptions for registrars?
The Conservative MP David Burrowes moved an amendment to protect mar-
riage registrars during the second reading in the House of Commons.124 The
Bill (in clause 2(4)(b)) expressly stated that those entitled to immunity from con-
ducting SSMs ‘[did] not include a registrar’. Some MPs considered this to be a
serious flaw.
The well-known case of the Islington Borough Council registrar Lillian
Ladele, whose claim went all the way to the European Court of Human
Rights,125 was the prime example mentioned in the House. It will be recalled
115 J Bingham, ‘First couple consider legal challenge to Church’s gay marriage opt-out’, Daily Telegraph,
2 August 2013.
116 Jim Shannon (Democratic Unionist), HC Deb 28 February 2013, vol 558, col 292.
117 Eg Jim Shannon HC Deb 5 February 2013, vol 558, col 165; Graham Brady (Con), HC Deb 5 February
2013, vol 558, col 172.
118 [2010] ECHR 995 at paras 101–110.
119 Ibid at para 93.
120 Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, ch 11, esp pp 377–378, 396–399.
121 Sindicatul ‘Păstorul Cel Bun’ v Romania, App no 2330/09 (ECtHR, 9 July 2013) at paras 162–168.
122 Ibid at para 4 per Wojtyczek J (concurring).
123 HL Deb 3 June 2013, col 997.
124 The first version (Amendment 11) was moved and debated at length at the Public Bill Committee
stage on 26 February 2013 (HC Deb, vol 558, col 220). The revised version was debated on 20
May 2013 (ibid, col 926 et seq). There is a useful summary in the House of Lords Library Notes,
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill (HL Bill 29 of 2013–14), 30 May 2013, LLN 2013/011.
125 Eweida v United Kingdom, App nos 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10 (ECtHR, 15 January
2013).
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that Mrs Ladele, a Christian, had intimated that, owing to her sincere religious
convictions, she did not feel able to conduct a civil partnership ceremony for any
same-sex couple seeking one. She had become a registrar of birth, deaths and
marriages in 2002 and two years later the UK Parliament passed the Civil
Partnership Act 2004, which came into effect in December 2005. The council
could have accommodated her conscientious position without interruption of
service and without any offence to those seeking civil partnerships. There
were more than sufficient registrars who did not share her views to cover
these duties. Other UK councils had organised their roster of registrars to
ensure that no objecting registrars would be forced to comply and that no
client would face any embarrassing refusal. However, the Islington Council’s
decision not to do so was found by both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and
the Court of Appeal to be lawful since it was acting in pursuit of a self-made
equality policy entitled (with no apparently intended irony) ‘Dignity for All’.126
The disciplinary proceedings instituted by the council against Ladele for gross
misconduct were upheld and her claim of religious discrimination was dis-
missed.127 The European Court of Human Rights upheld the Court of Appeal
decision in January 2013 and so the Strasbourg judgment was fresh in the par-
liamentarians’ minds during the SSM debate.
To return to the Burrowes amendment, it read:
New clause 2 – Conscientious objection –
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, no registrar shall be
under any duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal
requirement, to conduct, be present at, carry out, participate in, or
consent to the taking place of, a relevant marriage ceremony to which he
has a conscientious objection.
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall affect the duty of each registration
authority to ensure that there is a sufficient number of relevant marriage
registrars for its area to carry out in that area the functions of relevant mar-
riage registrars.
(3) The conscientious objection must be based on a sincerely-held religious
or other belief.
(4) In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection
shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it.128
126 London Borough of Islington v Ladele [2008] EAT Case No UKEAT/0453/08/RN (10 December 2008);
Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA 1357; [2010] 1 WLR 955 (CA).
127 Ladele’s religious discrimination claim had been upheld at first instance by the Employment
Tribunal: Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2008] ET, Case No 2203694/2007 (20 May 2008).
For further analysis see Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, pp 356–357.
128 HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol 563, col 926.
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There was also a similar amendment (new clause 3) to implement transitional
protection to preserve the right of conscientious objection for registrars
already employed.129 Several MPs noted that the Netherlands had such a transi-
tional exemption provision.130
The conscientious objection provision makes it clear that no client would be
denied a civil marriage ceremony owing to a want of suitable registrars and
hence a registrar would be unable to claim protection if no-one could cover
for him or her in that particular locality. Objecting registrars would also have
the onus of proving their refusal was grounded in sincere religious or other
beliefs. Some members drew the analogy with surgeons who were allowed,
under the conscientious objection provision in the abortion legislation, to
abstain from participation in abortions.131
Opponents of the new conscientious objection clause echoed the arguments
from the Saskatchewan case, Marriage Commissioners, discussed earlier. The
Labour MP Kate Green, for instance, contended: ‘We are talking about
someone who is performing a state function. They cannot pick and choose
when acting as an agent of the state to what extent they are prepared to fulfil
the function that they are required to perform.’132 The prospect that some regis-
trars might be forced to choose between their beliefs and their livelihood was
‘regrettable’ but ‘one of the things that [went] with being a public servant is
that one has to fulfil the requirements of the law of the land as it stands at
the time’.133 The analogy between objecting registrars and surgeons refusing
to do abortions was misplaced, countered one MP. The registrar’s sole duty
was to conduct marriage, whereas a surgeon had many duties, among which
abortion was a ‘tiny part’ of what they might be called to undertake.134
Burrowes did not press the permanent exemption (new clause 2) to a vote but
did put up the transitional exemption provision (new clause 3). The amendment
was lost by 340 to 150 votes.135
CONCLUSION
It is fitting that clergy and other religious ministers have been granted exemp-
tions to permit them to refuse to solemnise SSMs in those countries that
129 Ibid.
130 David Burrowes (Con), HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol 563, col 929.
131 Jim Shannon, HC Deb 26 February 2013, vol 536, col 232; David Burrowes, HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol
563, col 929. The conscientious objection exemption for medical practitioners is in s 4 of the
Abortion Act 1967.
132 HC Deb 26 February 2013, vol 536, col 225.
133 Kate Green (Lab), HC Deb 26 February 2013, vol 536, col 226.
134 Stephen Williams (Lib Dem), HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol 563, col 934. This overlooks the fact that
registrars also attend to the registration of birth and deaths, hence their full title.
135 HC Deb 20 May 2013, vol 563, col 966.
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have legalised marriages by same-sex couples. This core facet of religious group
autonomy has been guaranteed in the wake of considerable pressure from
churches (and other religious communities) to have the right to solemnise mar-
riages in accordance with the preservation of the religious community’s beliefs
and customs. Whether future parliaments or courts will overturn this exemption
is difficult to assess. Three, and even two, decades ago one would have been hard
pressed to find many who would have confidently predicted that SSM itself
would be legalised.
In New Zealand, the protection for religious ministers is weakened by the
requirement that the religious body to which the minister belongs must have
an express and clear rule on the matter. This is a problem for conservative
pastors and priests in those denominations that are still struggling to come to
a clear resolution either in favour of or against the solemnisation of SSM.
The attempt to extend protection to civil marriage celebrants has been
rejected in each country that has sought to do so. It was expressly considered
and rejected in the Westminster parliament. Meanwhile, the attempt by
Saskatchewan to introduce an exemption for civil celebrants was ruled to be
unconstitutional by that province’s court of appeal. The case for protection for
those who were already celebrants when SSM was legalised appears to be stron-
ger than for those appointed after the law came in. Even in that situation,
however, an exemption has been rejected. The operative reasoning has been
that those who work for the state must abide by official public norms. There
is no room for devout public servants to choose which citizens they will serve
when it comes to solemnising marriage (or civil unions for that matter).
There is a strange amnesia at work here insofar as the obligation of state to
accommodate the religious conscience of its employees is forgotten. It is a
safe prediction that devout religious persons (who hold to ‘traditional’ sexual
ethics) will withdraw from this area of the civil service.
But it might not come to this. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal approved in
principle a ‘single entry point’ system. Here, by way of a simple bureaucratic
process, a sensible reconciliation of the competing rights can be attained:
same-sex couples may obtain a state-sanctioned ceremony without enduring
rejection or embarrassment, while devout marriage commissioners can retain
their jobs and avert a violation of their conscience. If the hard-won right of reli-
gious liberty is to be preserved in increasingly secular Western societies, creative
solutions such as these will need to be found.
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